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POWER MEASURES DERIVED FROM THE SEQUENTIAL QUERY
PROCESS
GEOFFREY PRITCHARD, REYHANEH REYHANI, AND MARK C. WILSON
Abstract. We study a basic sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a
simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley-Shubik power index. We derive
in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual decisiveness in simple
games, and show that, as for the Shapley-Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures
for TU-games. These individual measures, which we call weighted semivalues, form a class
whose intersection with that of the class of weak semivalues yields the class of all semivalues.
We single out the simplest measure in this family for more investigation, as it is new to
the literature as far as we know. Although it is very different from the Shapley value, it
is closely related in several ways, and is the natural analogue of the Shapley value under
a nonstandard, but natural, definition of simple game. We illustrate this new measure by
calculating its values on some standard examples.
1. Introduction
Many authors have discussed the value theory of cooperative TU-games and its counterpart
for simple games, the theory of power measures. The material in the present paper arises from
a generalization of a particular measure of manipulability of voting rules (below called Q)
circulated in preprint form by the present authors. We realized that our original arguments
generalize greatly, and yield a general construction for TU-games that leads directly to a
large class of allocations including all semivalues. Amongst these, the simplest one yields a
semivalue with several attractive properties.
1.1. Our contribution. We explore the (Shapley-Shubik) sequential model for the formation
of winning coalitions in a simple game, and define (Section 3 and 4) a family of decisiveness
measures Q∗F and individual power measures q
∗
F for simple games. These measures satisfy
many desirable properties, and extend naturally to the class of TU-games. It turns out
that this construction generates the class of what we call weighted semivalues. We give
several interpretations of these values in Section 5. In this framework the simplest F is
affine and yields a weighted semivalue we call q∗0, which we single out for further attention.
Although it differs substantially from the Shapley-Shubik index, it is closely related as we see
in Section 5.3. We illustrate the new measures by applying them to some well-known games,
including games derived from the study of strategic manipulation of voting rules, our original
motivating examples.
1.2. Basic definitions. The definitions of simple game and TU-game are not entirely stan-
dardized. We use the most common definitions found in the literature. However, in Sec-
tion 5.3, we shall drop some of the assumptions made here.
A TU-game on a finite set X is defined by its characteristic function v : 2X → R, such
that v(∅) = 0. We denote the class of all TU-games on X by G(X). The class of finitely
additive TU-games consists of those games satisfying v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) = v(S) + v(T )
for all S, T ⊆ X, and is denoted AG(X). A TU-game is monotonic if A ⊆ B ⊆ X implies
v(A) ≤ v(B).
An allocation on X is a function ψ : G(X)→ AG(X).
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Remark. An allocation is often called a value assignment or simply value. An additive
game is completely specified by the value of v on singletons, so an allocation is just a way
of associating a nonnegative real number with each player (we prefer not to use a vector, in
order to avoid choosing an arbitrary ordering on players).
A simple game [10] G = (X,W ) on a finite set X is defined by a collection W of subsets of
X (called winning coalitions), such that ∅ 6∈ W . Equivalently, it is a TU-game on X where
v takes only the values 0 and 1 (the value 1 corresponding to the property “winning”, whilst
coalitions with value 0 are called losing). Note that we do not require that the game be
nonempty — that is, we may have W = ∅. The class of all simple games on X is denoted
SG(X) and we define SG analogously to G. A special class of game is the (weak) unanimity
game US defined by S, where a coalition is winning if and only if it contains S. When |S| = 1
this is called a dictatorial game.
2. The random query process
Let G = (X,W ) ∈ SG. Consider the following stochastic process. We choose elements of
X sequentially without repetition, at each step choosing uniformly from the set of elements
not yet chosen, until the set of elements seen so far first becomes a winning coalition. This
is the same process considered by Shapley and Shubik [9] in defining their power index (see
Section 5.2 for more details).
We first consider the random variable equal to the number of queries required.
Definition 2.1. Let V1, . . . , Vn be elements sampled without replacement from X, where n =
|X|. Equivalently, pi := (V1, . . . , Vn) is a uniformly random permutation of X, representing
the order in which elements are to be chosen. Let
Qpi(G) = min{k : {V1, . . . , Vk} contains a winning coalition}.
Remark. If the game is empty we will not find a winning coalition. In this case we define
Qpi(G) to have the value n+1. If the game is monotone, in Definition 2.1 the word “contains”
can be replaced by “is”.
Definition 2.2. The quantity Q(G) is defined to be the expectation of Q(G) with respect to
the uniform distribution on permutations of X.
2.1. Non-sequential interpretation. The sequential nature of the process is only appar-
ent, once we have averaged over all possible orders. Thus we ought to be able to find a
representation of Q(G) that does not mention order of players. In order to do this, we assume
from now on that the game is monotone.
Definition 2.3. For each natural number k, define the probability measure mk to be the
uniform measure on the set of all subsets of X of size k. Thus each subset of X of size k is
equally likely to be chosen, with probability
(
n
k
)−1
.
For each natural number k, we let Wk (respectively, Lk) denote the set of all winning
(respectively, losing) coalitions of size k.
Lemma 2.4. For each k with 0 ≤ k ≤ n,
Pr(Q(G) ≤ k) = Pr(Wk)
where the latter probability is with respect to mk.
In other words, the probability that we require at most k queries to find a winning coalition
equals the probability that a randomly chosen k-subset is a winning coalition.
Proof. The event Q(G) ≤ k means precisely that the initial subset A(Q(G), k) formed by
the first k queries contains a winning subset. Each subset of X of size k occurs with equal
probability
(
n
k
)−1
as an initial subset of queries of the query sequence, so that A(Q(G), k) is
distributed as a uniform random sample from Xk. 
POWER MEASURES DERIVED FROM THE SEQUENTIAL QUERY PROCESS 3
Remark. The cumulative distribution function of Q(G) can thus be computed by simply count-
ing the number of winning coalitions of each fixed size.
We can now derive a simple explicit formula for Q(G).
Lemma 2.5.
Q(G) = n+ 1−
n∑
k=0
|Wk|(
n
k
) .
Proof. For every pi, Qpi(G) is at most n + 1. If G is empty then Wk is empty for all k and
Q(G) = n + 1, as expected. Otherwise, Wn has a single element and Qpi(G) is at most n.
Thus by Lemma 2.4 we have
Q(G) = E[Q(G)]
=
n+1∑
k=0
k Pr(Q(G) = k)
=
n∑
k=0
Pr(Q(G) > k)
=
n∑
k=0
|Lk|(
n
k
)
= n+ 1−
n∑
k=0
|Wk|(
n
k
)

Remark. Note that the summation can start at k = 1 because the game is nontrivial. If we
allowed trivial games, then the value of the formula for Q(G) would be 0, which agrees with
intuition.
3. Changes of variable and collective measures
The number of random queries made in order to find a winning coalition seems to us to
be a fundamental quantity of a simple game. The quantity Q(G) intuitively seems to be a
measure of inertia or resistance (as discussed in [4]): its value is large if winning coalitions
are scarce, and small if they are plentiful. The rescaled quantity 1−Q(G)/(n + 1) looks like
an index of what has been called complaisance [4, 7] and decisiveness [2]. We consider far
more general rescalings of Q(G), with interesting consequences as will be seen below.
Definition 3.1. Let F be the set of all real-valued functions on the nonnegative integer
quadrant N2. Let F ∈ F satisfy
(i) F (n, k) is decreasing in k for each fixed n.
(ii) F (n, 0) = 1 and F (n, k) = 0 whenever k > n.
We say that F is an admissible rescaling.
Remark. We do not require that F be decreasing in n for each fixed k.
We shall see below that there is a direct relationship between F and the function f obtained
as follows.
Lemma 3.2. There is a bijection F ↔ f given by
f(n, k) =
F (n, k)− F (n, k + 1)(
n
k
)(1)
F (n, k) =
n∑
j=k
f(n, j)
(
n
j
)
.(2)
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Note that F is admissible if and only if f is nonnegative and
∑n
k=0 f(n, k)
(
n
k
)
= 1.
There is a bijection F ↔ µ given by
F (n, k) =
n∑
j=k
µ(n, j)
µ(n, j) = F (n, k)− F (n, k + 1)
Note that F is admissible if and only if for each n, µ(n, ·) is a probability measure on
{0, . . . , n}. 
Remark. We shall often write µn(k) for µ(n, k).
We now define our candidate for a measure of decisiveness.
Definition 3.3. Let G = (X,W ) ∈ SG. Define Q∗F (G) : SG → R by
Q∗F (G) = E[F (Q(G))]
where the expectation is taken with respect to the uniform distribution on permutations of X
as in Definition 2.2.
Proposition 3.4. The function Q∗F is a decisiveness index on SG. Explicitly,
Q∗F (G) =
n∑
k=0
f(n, k)|Wk|
where f and F are linked as in (1).
Proof. Let f be as given in (1). Then
n∑
k=0
f(n, k)|Wk| =
n∑
k=0
f(n, k)
(
n
k
)
Pr(Q(G) ≤ k)
=
n∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
f(n, k)
(
n
k
)
Pr(Q(G) = j)
=
n∑
j=0

 n∑
k=j
f(n, k)
(
n
k
)Pr(Q(G) = j)
=
n∑
j=0
F (n, j) Pr(Q(G) = j)
= E[F (Q(G))].
Now (1) and the standing assumptions on F imply that Q∗F takes values between 0 and 1 and
these values are attained. Hence Q∗F is a decisiveness index on SG according to the definition
in [11]. 
Example 3.5. Choosing f(n, k) = 2−n yields the Coleman index [?]. In this case µn is the
binomial distribution with parameter 1/2, and
F (n, k) = 2−n
n∑
j=k
(
n
j
)
which equals the probability that a uniformly randomly chosen subset has size at least k.
Example 3.6. The simplest functional form of the construction above occurs when F (n, k) =
1− k/(n + 1), in which case µn is the uniform distribution and
Q∗0(G) := Q
∗
F (G) =
1
n+ 1
n∑
k=0
1(
n
k
) |Wk| = 1− Q(G)
n+ 1
.
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There is a close connection between power and decisiveness measures for simple games
and value theory of TU-games [11]. In view of that connection, it is natural to generalize to
TU-games.
Definition 3.7. For each admissible F , define a map Q∗F : G → R as follows. For each game
G = (X, v),
Q∗F (G) :=
n∑
k=0
f(n, k)
∑
|S|=k,S⊆X
v(S) =
∑
S⊆X
f(n, |S|)v(S).
We usually denote Q∗F (G) simply by Q
∗
F when no confusion is likely.
This extended definition of Q∗F yields a very general object, called a collective value in [11].
3.1. The self-dual case. We can derive some special formulae for Q∗F in important special
cases. We recall that the dual of a TU-game G = (X, v) is the TU-game G∗ = (X, v∗) where
v∗(S) = v(X)− v(X \ S) for each S. In the case of simple games, winning coalitions become
losing, and vice versa, when passing to the dual. A game is self-dual if v∗(S) = v(S) for all
S.
Proposition 3.8. Let G = (X, v) ∈ G and suppose that F satisfies the identity
(3) F (n, k)− F (n, k + 1) = F (n, n− k)− F (n, n+ 1− k).
If G is self-dual, then Q∗F (G) = v(X)/2.
Remark. The condition on F says that the probability measure µn is symmetric on [0..n].
For example, the Coleman index satisfies this property, and Proposition 3.9 was proved for
that special case in [2, Proposition 3.4]. The index Q∗0 also satisfies the condition. This
condition we call self-duality for the following reason. Given a collective value I, define
another collective value I∗ by I∗(G) = I(G∗). The value is self-dual if I = I∗. It is easily
seen that a collective value of the form Q∗F is self-dual if and only if F satisfies the stated
condition.
Proof. Let I = q∗F satisfy the stated condition and let G be a self-dual game. Then
I(G) + I(G∗) =
∑
S
f(n, |S|)v(S) +
∑
S
f(n, |S|) [v(X) − v(S)]
=
∑
k
f(n, k)
(
n
k
)
v(X)
= v(X)
while
I(G)− I(G∗) =
∑
S
f(n, |S|)v(S) −
∑
S
f(n, |S|) [v(X) − v(S)]
=
∑
S
f(n, |S|)v(S) −
∑
S
f(n, |X \ S|)v(X \ S)
= 0.
The result follows by solving for I(G). 
In the case of simple games we can say a little more. Recall that a simple game is proper
if the complement of each winning coalition is losing, and strong if the complement of every
losing coalition is winning.
Proposition 3.9. Let G = (N,W ) be a simple game and suppose that F satisfies the identity
(3).
(i) If G is proper and strong then Q∗F (G) = 1/2.
(ii) If G is proper and not strong then Q∗F (G) < 1/2.
(iii) If G is strong and not proper then Q∗F (G) > 1/2.
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Proof. For each k we define four types of subset: Dk (respectively Ck) consists of those which
are winning, and whose complement is not (respectively is), whereas Qk (respectively Pk)
consists of those which are losing, and whose complement is not (respectively is). Comple-
mentation yields a map from G to G∗ such that Dk ⇔ Pn−k, Ck ⇔ Cn−k, Qk ⇔ Qn−k. Thus
Q∗F (G) +Q
∗
F (G
∗) = 1 as in the proof of the previous proposition, and
Q∗F (G) −Q
∗
F (G
∗) =
∑
k
f(n, k) (|Dk|+ |Ck|)−
∑
k
f(n, k) (|Qk|+ |Pk|)
=
∑
k
f(n, k) (|Dk|+ |Ck|)−
∑
k
f(n, k) (Qk +Dk)
=
∑
k
f(n, k) (|Ck| − |Qk|) .
G is proper if and only if Ck = 0 for all k, while G is strong if and only if Qk = 0 for all k (a
simple game is proper and strong if and only if it is self-dual). The results follow by solving
for Q∗F (G). 
Example 3.10. Next, we consider the unweighted qualified majority voting game. The win-
ning coalitions are precisely those of size at least k0, for some fixed k0 (depending on n).
The value of Q∗F on such a game equals
∑n
k=k0
f(n, k)
(
n
k
)
= F (n, k0). Thus if n is odd and
k0 = (n + 1)/2 (the straight majority game), Q
∗
F has value F (n, (n + 1)/2. If furthermore F
satisfies the symmetry condition (3), then direct computation shows that Q∗F takes the value
1/2. This is to be expected, since the game in question is proper and strong.
4. Individual measures
In this section we discuss properties of the marginal function of Q∗F , which we denote q
∗
F .
Explicitly, q∗F,i(G) = Q
∗
F (G)−Q
∗
F (G−{i}). We first review some properties of semivalues and
generalizations.
4.1. Semivalues and related concepts. Several classes of allocations have been discussed
in the literature. They can be given by axiomatic characterizations, but explicit formulae are
more useful for our purposes.
Definition 4.1. Let X be a finite set.
A weighted weak semivalue on X is an allocation on X that has the form
ψi(v) =
∑
S⊆X
p(S) [v(S)− v(S \ {i}]
where p(S) ≥ 0.
A weak semivalue on X is a weighted weak semivalue for which
∑
S:i∈S p(S) = 1 for each
i ∈ X.
Remark. The above concepts were introduced in [1] in axiomatic terms. An equivalent formu-
lation is that an allocation is a weighted weak semivalue if and only if it satisfies the standard
axioms of Linearity, Positivity, Projection and Balanced Contributions.
Definition 4.2. A weighted semivalue on X is a weighted weak semivalue for which p(S)
depends only on |S|, and thus has the form
(4) ψi(v) =
n∑
k=0
f(n, k)
∑
|S|=k,S⊆X
[v(S)− v(S \ {i}]
where f(n, k) ≥ 0 for all n, k.
A semivalue on X is a weighted semivalue on X that in addition satisfies the normalization
condition
(5)
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
f(n, k) = 1.
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Remark. The definitions have the unfortunate consequence that a semivalue is a weighted
weak semivalue that is both a weak semivalue and a weighted semivalue! The term weighted
semivalue is formally used in the present paper for the first time, to our knowledge.
In [3] it was proven that semivalues are precisely the allocations satisfying the standard
axioms Linearity, Positivity, Projection and Anonymity. The last says that if pi : X → X is a
permutation, then ψ(pii) = piψ(i) for each i ∈ X. Note that because of Anonymity, we may
assume that X = Xn := {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n = |X|. Let G denote the union
⋃
n G(Xn).
A semivalue on G is a function that for each n restricts to a semivalue on Xn. In [3] it was
shown that in addition to the explicit form (5), the recursion
(6) f(n, k) = f(n+ 1, k) + f(n+ 1, k + 1)
is necessary and sufficient for such an extension.
The particular weighted semivalue we have in mind is the marginal function of Q∗. We
first show that rescaling is needed in all but the most trivial cases.
Proposition 4.3. Let F be an admissible rescaling, let f be related to F as in Lemma 3.2
and let ψ be defined as in (4). Then
(i) ψ gives a weighted semivalue on Xn for each n.
(ii) Let cn =
∑n
k=1
(
n−1
k−1
)
f(n, k). Then ψ˜ defined by ψ˜i(v) = ψi(v)/cn gives a semivalue on
Xn for each n.
(iii) ψ gives a semivalue on Xn if and only if f(n, k) = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 and f(n, n) = 1.
Proof. Note that ψ gives a weighted semivalue on Gn because F is admissible, hence f(n, k) ≥ 0
for all n, k. Dividing by cn ensures that the normalization condition (5) is satisfied. Finally,
suppose that cn = 1 and let ank =
(
n
k
)
f(n, k). By admissibility, ank ≥ 0 and
∑
k ank = 1. By
hypothesis, 1 = cn =
∑
k
k
n
ank. Subtracting these two equalities yields the result. 
4.2. The marginal function of Q∗F . The marginal function of a decisiveness index is of-
ten interpreted as a power index (the analogue for TU-games is the relationship between a
potential and an allocation [11, ?]). We now explore this direction.
Proposition 4.4. Let F be an admissible rescaling. Then
(i) Q∗F is the potential function of a function q
∗
F that for each n induces a weighted semivalue
on Gn, given by
q∗F,i =
n∑
k=0
f(n, k)
∑
|S|=k
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})]
=
∑
S:i∈S
f(n, |S|)Di(S)
Here F and f are related as in Lemma 3.2.
(ii) Let
cn :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
k [F (n, k)− F (n, k + 1)] .
Then the normalized quantity q∗F /cn is a semivalue on Xn for each n.
(iii) q∗F is a weighted semivalue on G if and only if F satisfies the recursion identity
(7) F (n, k)−F (n, k+1) =
n+ 1− k
n+ 1
F (n+1, k)+
2k − n
n+ 1
F (n+1, k+1)−
k + 1
n + 1
F (n+1, k+2).
If, furthermore, cn is independent of n, then the normalized quantity q
∗
F/cn is a semivalue
on G, given by ∑
S:i∈S
f(n, |S|)
Q∗F (U1)
Di(S)
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Proof. The first part follows from Proposition 4.3 because q∗F has exactly the form stated. The
other results follow from the basic characterization of semivalues, translating the formulae for
f into those for F . The coherence recursion (6) translates into
F (n, k) − F (n, k + 1) =
n+ 1− k
n+ 1
[F (n+ 1, k) − F (n+ 1, k + 1)]
+
k + 1
n+ 1
[F (n+ 1, k + 1)− F (n+ 1, k + 2)] .
Note that cn is precisely the value Q
∗
F (U{1}) of Q
∗
F on the dictatorial game with n players.
The result now follows by algebraic simplification. 
The construction above is in fact universal.
Proposition 4.5. There is a bijection between probability measures on {0, 1, . . . , n} and
weighted semivalues on Gn given by µn ↔ q
∗
F .
Proof. From Proposition 4.4, q∗F is a weighted semivalue. Conversely, given a weighted semi-
value ξ we define µn(k) = f(n, k) := f(n, k)/cn where cn :=
∑
k f(n, k)
(
n
k
)
. Then defining F
by (1) applied to f we have q∗F = ξ. 
Remark. Note that a weighted semivalue satisfies the normalization condition for a semivalue
if and only if for each n, the mean of µn is exactly n.
The recursion (6) translates to
µn(k) =
[
1−
k
n+ 1
]
µn+1(k) +
k + 1
n+ 1
µn+1(k + 1).
Example 4.6. For the Coleman index, the marginal function is given by f(n, k) = 2−n. The
associated semivalue (obtained by dividing by Q∗F (U1) = 1/2) is the Banzhaf value.
Example 4.7. We now consider the Shapley value, given by
σi(G) =
∑
∅⊂S⊆X
(n− |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
n!
[v(S) − v(S \ {i})]
=
∑
∅⊂S⊆X
|S|−1(
n
|S|
) [v(S)− v(S \ {i})]
=
n∑
k=1
1
k
(
n
k
) ∑
S⊆X,|S|=k
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})]
It is the semivalue associated to q∗F where F (n, 0) = 1 and for k ≥ 1
F (n, k) =
Hn −Hk−1
Hn
:=
∑n
j=k
1
j∑n
j=1
1
j
.
where Hn denotes as usual the nth harmonic number.
We single out the simplest case for special mention. Recall that a regular semivalue is one
for which the weights f(n, k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n are all nonzero.
Proposition 4.8. The formula
(8)
q∗0,i
Q∗0(U1)
=
2
n+ 1
n∑
k=0
∑
S⊆X,|S|=k
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})](
n
k
)
defines a regular semivalue on G.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 3.9, because F (n, k) = 1−k/(n+1)
satisfies the identity (3) and so q∗0 is self-dual. 
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5. Interpretation of the measures
The collective value Q∗F can be easily interpreted as a decisiveness index on simple games,
which gives the probability of finding a winning coalition when coalitions are sampled first by
choosing size according to µn and then choosing a coalition of that size uniformly at random.
The individual value q∗F can be interpreted in the usual way (not without controversy) as a
power index [11]. In this section we consider some other interpretations.
5.1. Coalition formation. Consider the following model of coalition formation [5]. We
assume that each possible coalition (subset S of X) forms with probability p(S), and that
only one coalition S will form. Consider the following two expectations. First, the ex ante
expected marginal contribution of i to S is
E[Di(S)] := E[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] =
∑
S:i∈S
p(S) (v(S)− v(S \ {i})) .
The ex interim expected marginal contribution of i to S, conditional on i ∈ S, is
Φi(v, p) := E[Di(S) | S ∋ i] =
E[Di(S)]
Pr(S ∋ i)
.
Then [5, Proposition 3] the maps Φi(·, p) are in bijection with the set of all probability
distributions on 2X . Furthermore the map corresponding to p is precisely the weighted weak
semivalue given by
Φi(v, p) =
∑
S:i∈S
p(S)∑
T :i∈T p(T )
Di(S).
Note that Φ is a weak semivalue if and only if
∑
T :i∈T p(T ) does not depend on i, and a
semivalue if and only, if in addition, p(S) depends only on |S|. Thus for weak semivalues, the
ex ante and ex interim marginal contribution of i to S is the same.
We now apply the above framework to our measures q∗F .
Proposition 5.1. Let F be an admissible rescaling. Then under the coalition formation model
above, q∗F,i gives the ex ante expected contribution of i to S, while the associated semivalue
gives the ex interim expected marginal contribution of i to S, conditional on i ∈ S. 
Remark. The special case of the Shapley value was discussed in [5, Proposition 2], where
essentially the same formula was derived.
5.2. Sequential interpretation. The Shapley value σ can be defined sequentially as follows.
Given a game G = (X, v), follow the query process and at each step award v(S)− v(S \ {i})
to i, where S is the set of elements queried so far and i is the last element queried. The
expected value with respect to the uniform distribution on permutations of X is the Shapley
value σi(G). For simple games, this means that we award 1 point to i whenever i is pivotal,
and 0 otherwise.
We can generalize this interpretation to measures of the form q∗F . We follow the query
process, and award kµn(k) to the pivotal element if the process stops at k queries. For
example, for q∗0 this means awarding k/(n+1), the fraction of the maximum possible number
of queries made (a possible interpretation is that we offer a higher price to pivotal elements to
reveal themselves as we repeatedly fail to find them) . This corresponds to the nonsequential
formula for q∗F using the analogous computation to that for the Shapley value above.
5.3. Another model of semivalues. The standard model of simple game requires that the
empty coalition never be winning (this is a consequence of the standard assumption that
v(∅) = 0 for all TU-games). For reasons of mathematical elegance, at least, we prefer that
the class of simple games be closed under duality. This then requires that the grand coalition
is always winning, which is a reasonable assumption for weighted voting games. However for
many applications, such as to the study of manipulation, empty games naturally arise. Thus,
by duality, we should admit trivial games to the class of simple games. This approach is
followed, for example, by Taylor and Zwicker [10].
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We denote by SG+(X) the class of simple games in this extended sense. The analogue for
TU-games we denote G+(X).
In this new model, the axiomatic definition of semivalue remains the same, since the effi-
ciency, anonymity, positivity and projection axioms still make sense. However the character-
ization of [3] changes slightly.
Proposition 5.2. A function ψ is a semivalue on G+(X) if and only if it has the form
ψ(i) =
∑
k
f(n, k)
∑
S⊆X,|S|=k
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})]
where f(n, k) ≥ 0 and f satisfies the identity
∑
k
f(n, k)
(
n
k
)
= 1.
Such a function extends to a semivalue on G+ if and only if f also satisfies the identity
f(n, k) = f(n, k + 1) + f(n+ 1, k + 1).
Proof. The proof of [3] still works, with the only change being that the normalization condition
is slightly different. This is because the vector space of all games now includes the empty game
in the standard basis of unanimity games and so has dimension one more than before. 
Corollary 5.3. Let F be admissible. Then q∗F is a semivalue on G
+(X).
Remark. For example, q∗0 is the exact analogue of the Shapley value in this new context. The
Shapley value is the semivalue that has equal weight on all coalition sizes from 1 to n, hence
the formula f(n, k) = [n
(
n−1
k−1
)
]−1, whereas q∗0 has equal weight on all coalition sizes from 0 to
n.
6. The measures Q∗0 and q
∗
0
We recall that Q∗0(G) is the probability that a randomly sampled coalition is winning, when
a coalition size is chosen uniformly and condition on that a particular coalition is chosen.
Alternatively, it gives the expected fraction of the maximum possible number of queries saved
when players are sampled uniformly at random without replacement until a winning coalition
has been found.
Example 6.1. We present the values of Q∗0 for all simple games with 4 players (up to iso-
morphism). Because of anonymity, we may call the players 1, 2, 3, 4 and we define each game
by listing its minimal winning coalitions in the obvious way (the last line corresponds to the
empty coalition). Table 1 is the analogue of the table in [2] for the Coleman index C, which
we also list for comparison. We have reordered some rows from the table in [2], by permuting
some rows with equal values of C. These rows are marked with ∗.
Note that the values of C always (weakly) decrease going down the column, as do those
of Q∗0. Thus C and Q
∗
0 never disagree on the relative decisiveness of two games when they
both agree that two games are not equally decisive. Even though the range of the values of C
(excluding the empty game) is much larger than the range of values of Q∗0, the latter never
has equal values on two games when the former does not, but the former sometimes has equal
values when the latter does not. Thus Q∗0 appears to discriminate better between games.
The next type of example was our original motivation for the study of Q∗0. The quantity
Q seems to us a compelling way to measure the effort taken by an external agent to change
the outcome of the election via manipulation. Assuming that the voting situation is known
but not the complete profile (we may know from polling data how many voters of each type
there are, but not their identity), the agent incurs a unit cost to determine each voter’s type.
The sequential model occurs naturally here.
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Wm C Q∗0
1; 2; 3; 4 0.9375 0.8000
1; 2; 3 0.8750 0.7500
1; 2; 34 0.8125 0.7000
1; 2 0.7500 0.6667
1; 23; 24; 34 0.7500 0.6500
1; 23; 24 0.6875∗ 0.6067
12; 13; 14; 23; 24; 34 0.6875∗ 0.6000
12; 13; 14; 23; 24 0.6250 0.5833
1; 23 0.6250 0.5500
1; 234 0.5625∗ 0.5500
12; 13; 14; 23 0.5625∗ 0.5333
12; 13; 24; 34 0.5625∗ 0.5333
1 0.5000 0.5000
12; 13; 23 0.5000 0.5000
12; 13; 24 0.5000 0.5000
12; 13; 14; 234 0.5000 0.5000
12; 34 0.4375∗ 0.4667
12; 13; 234 0.4375∗ 0.4667
12; 13; 14 0.4375∗ 0.4500
12; 13 0.3750 0.4167
12; 134; 234 0.3750 0.4033
123; 124; 134; 234 0.3125∗ 0.4000
12; 134 0.3125∗ 0.3833
123; 124; 134 0.2500 0.3500
12 0.2500 0.3333
123; 124 0.1875 0.3000
123 0.1250 0.2500
1234 0.0625 0.2000
0.0000 0.0000
Table 1. Values of Q∗0 and q0 for simple games with 4 players.
Example 6.2. Consider a 3-candidate election where voters submit complete and total pref-
erence orders. Suppose that the voting situation is as follows: 2 voters have preference order
abc, 1 has bac and another has cba. A manipulation is a change of vote by some subset that
causes a preferred outcome for those voters, assuming the other voters continue to vote sin-
cerely. We define a winning coalition to be a subset containing a subset that can manipulate
coalitionally. Here for concreteness we break ties uniformly at random, and assume risk-averse
manipulators (see [8] for more details).
Using a positional scoring rule that awards 1, α, 0 points to the first, second, third ranked
candidates, we see that the scores of a, b, c respectively are 2 + α, 1 + 3α, 1.
There is no manipulating coalition which can make c win, since the last voter cannot help
c overtake both a and b, while the other voters have no incentive to do so.
If α ≤ 1/2 then a wins (solely, unless α = 1/2 in which case a and b tie). The cba voter
can change to bca, and this allows b to win, so is preferred by that voter. Thus a manipulating
coalition of size 1 exists. Furthermore, if α ≥ 1/3, then the bac voter also has the power to
make b win by voting bca. It follows that for 1/3 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, the winning coalitions are those
containing either of the last two voters, while for 0 ≤ α < 1/3, the winning coalitions are those
containing the last voter. In the former case, a winning coalition is found by the random query
process after 3 queries for 4 of the 24 possible query sequences, after 2 queries for 8 query
sequences and after 1 query for 12 query sequences. Thus Q = 40/24 and Q∗0 = 1−Q/5 = 2/3.
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Similarly, in the latter case the relevant voter is found after 1,2,3, or 4 queries in each of 6
query sequences, leading to Q = 60/24 and Q∗0 = 1/2.
If α > 1/2 then b is the sole winner. Either of the abc voters can make a win by switching
to acb. In this case we have by the same argument as above that Q∗0 = 2/3. As described in
detail above, these values of Q∗0 give a measure of the probability of finding a manipulating
coalition when coalitions are sampled according to a particular probability distribution.
In the case 0 ≤ α < 1/3, the individual measure q∗0 has the value 0 for all but the last voter,
and 1/2 for that voter. When 1/3 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, the values are 0 for the first two voters, and
2/15 for each of the last two, whereas when 1/2 < α, the roles of the first pair and last pair
are reversed. These numbers represent the ex ante probability of being critical in a winning
coalition, if coalitions form according to the particular probabilistic model used here.
6.1. A bargaining model. Laruelle and Valenciano [6] present a model of bargaining in-
tended to help give a noncooperative foundation to the theory of power indices and values.
They discuss a setup where a proposer suggests an initial allocation of payoffs to a winning
coalition containing the proposer. Let p be a map that for each set X of players, takes each
simple game on X to a probability distribution over X × 2X . The idea is that pG(i, S) is
the probability that i will be the proposer with the support of S. They impose a dummy
axiom which leads to the condition that pG(i, S) = 0 unless i swings S. Anonymity is also a
reasonable assumption.
They discuss nonsequential (“first choose S, then i”) and sequential (“choose i and S simul-
taneously”) approaches. In the former case, given a probability distribution over coalitions
where the probability of S depends only on |S|, in the first round we choose S and then choose
choosing i ∈ S uniformly at random. If i swings S, then i is the proposer, otherwise we repeat
rounds until a proposer is found). Thus we are in the arena of weighted semivalues and we
write p(n, s) for p(S) when |X| = n.
Proposition 6.3. Let F be admissible and consider the nonsequential protocol above, where S
is chosen according to the probability given by µF . Let pii be the probability that i is eventually
chosen as the proposer, and let ri be the probability that i is chosen as proposer in the first
step. Then there is c so that pii = cri for all i.
In particular, for F = F0, pii equals the Shapley-Shubik index of i.
Proof. Let ri denote the probability that i is chosen as proposer in the first step. Then
pii = ri/
∑
i ri. Now
ri =
∑
S:S∈W,i∈S,S\{i}6∈W
p(S)
|S|
=
∑
S 6=∅
p(S)
Di(S)
|S|
=
n∑
k=1
f(n, k)
k
∑
|S|=k
Di(S)
When F = F0, f(n, k)/k is precisely [n + 1]
−1 times the coefficient found in the Shapley-
Shubik index, namely [k
(
n
k
)
]−1. Thus ri equals [n + 1]
−1 times the Shapley-Shubik index σi
of i. Thus since
∑
i ri is independent of i (in fact it equals [n + 1]
−1), the ratios pii/ri are
constant, and so the normalized probability pii equals σi. 
Remark. This result was stated (in other words) without proof in [6, p. 124].
In the sequential scenario, the query process seems a very natural one. If the pivotal voter
is always chosen as the proposer, then the probability of being the proposer is again the
Shapley-Shubik index. However other choices are possible. For example, for each admissible
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F , if we weight the pivotal voter by kµn(k) every time it is pivotal in position k, and then
compute the overall probability accordingly, we obtain the normalized version of q∗F .
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